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Abstract
By studying a panel dataset of distributed denial of service attack across 240 coun-
tries over 5 years, we find that enforcing the Convention on Cybercrime had in-
creased the intensity of attack by 43 to 52 percent. It did not significantly reduce
the chance for a country to be selected for the attack. We conducted a battery
of identification and falsification tests to show that such increased attack intensity
arose because of failure in marginal deterrence, instead of other theories such as
brutalization, stigmatization, or defiance, or general forms of endogeneity. We show
that raising the standard of proof of conviction is one way to facilitate marginal
deterrence, but it has the undesirable effect of raising the offense rate. We discuss
other possible solutions. JEL Codes: K14, K42, M15.
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The effect of law enforcement on deterring harmful acts is a key question of interest
to policy makers. The economic analysis of criminal behavior suggests that potential
perpetrators make rational decisions when deciding whether to undertake a harmful act,
and so standard economic tools to study choices can be readily extended to analyze crime
and the impact of law enforcement (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973b). However, empirical
research faces two challenges. First, besides deciding whether to undertake a harmful
act, potential perpetrators also choose to what extent to carry out the act.1 Undeterred
perpetrators may increase the magnitude of their malicious acts in response to law en-
forcement,2 and so, for optimal deterrence, the expected sanction of a more serious offense
should exceed that of a less serious offense, i.e., there should be “marginal deterrence”
(Stigler, 1970). The marginal deterrence theory suggests that any observed decrease in
crime rate due to law enforcement may not imply reduced cost of the crime to the soci-
ety, because undeterred perpetrators may commit more serious offenses and inflict bigger
damages on victims.
Second, potential perpetrators also choose which crimes to commit. If a new law
criminalizes or increases the sanction of a certain act, people may substitute that act
by other related acts (Katyal, 1997). If drink-driving is criminalized, people who drive
after a party may take drugs instead of drinking alcohol, which poses similar danger to
other road users. The theory of crime substitution implies that the social impact of law
enforcement is not confined to the crime that the law targets. To estimate such impact,
we should look beyond the specific crime under study. This poses a big empirical challenge
because the data of related crimes are often not available.
Here, we take advantage of a unique setting to overcome these two empirical chal-
lenges and estimate the impact of law enforcement on deterring a new class of crime, viz.,
1 These two decisions can be referred to, respectively, as the extensive and intensive margins of crime.
2 Re-using the examples of Stigler (1970, page 527), “If the offender will be executed for a minor assault
and for a murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder. If the thief has his hand cut off for taking
five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.”
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cybercrime. The law that we consider is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cyber-
crime (COC), which criminalizes a wide set of improper behaviors related to the use of
computer networks and equipment. The specific cybercrime under study is distributed
denial of service (DDOS) attack, which maliciously occupies the resources available to a
computer so that the computer cannot serve its original purpose.3
We compiled a dataset of DDOS attack at the country level, including the duration
and number of data packets generated in each of the offenses. We could overcome the
first empirical challenge related to marginal deterrence because, other than crime (DDOS
attack) rate, we also observe the intensity (magnitude) of the attacks to each country. So,
we can estimate how enforcement of the COC had affected the extensive and intensive
margins of DDOS attack.
Further, the COC practically criminalizes all cybercrimes, and so its scope is much
broader than the law enforcement efforts studied in the prior literature. This wide cover-
age allows us to precisely quantify the impact of enforcing the COC in terms of deterring
DDOS attack, without worrying about substitution by other cybercrimes, and so, effec-
tively eludes the second empirical challenge described above.
Our dataset comprises records of daily DDOS attacks targeting victims (computers)
in 240 countries in 177 days from 2004 to 2008.4 By conducting a battery of identification
and falsification tests, we find insignificant evidence of deterrence in the general, “crime
rate reduction” sense. Specifically, enforcing the COC could have reduced the chance for
3 In general, a denial of service attack is characterized by “an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent
legitimate users of a service from using that service”. Usually, to crash a victim’s service, perpetrators
would first take control of a large number of vulnerable hosts on the Internet and organize them into a
“zombie” network (often called botnets). These “zombies” would then launch coordinated attacks against
the victim (hence “distributed” denial of service, DDOS). Common DDOS attacks exhaust consumable
but scarce and non-renewable resources of a service, such as network bandwidth, memory, or central
processing unit (CPU) time. Therefore, from a perpetrator’s perspective, the success of a DDOS attack
hinges greatly on the total number of data packets that can be flooded to the target in a fixed unit of
time. For a brief introduction, see Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), Denial of Service
Attacks. http://www.cert.org/tech tips/denial of service.html.
4 The data of some regions, for example, Macao and U.S. Virgin Islands, were separately recorded as
different countries in our dataset. For simplicity, we refer to these regions as “countries”.
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a country to be selected for DDOS attack by an insignificnat 2.5%. However, in countries
eventually attacked, the perpetrators committed significantly more serious offenses, in the
sense of a 43-52% increase in intensity. These seemingly conflicting outcomes indicate
that, consistent with predictions of the marginal deterrence theory, the COC had deterred
minor but provoked more serious DDOS offenses.
Further, we find evidence that marginal deterrence can be better achieved by raising
the standard of criminalization, and that perpetrators responded more sharply to COC
enforcement in countries with better Internet infrastructure. Overall, although enforcing
the COC may help reduce DDOS attack rate, it might stimulate more intensive attacks
too. Since the loss of a country depends on both the chance and intensity of the attack,
the net impact of enforcing the COC on deterring DDOS attack is ambiguous.5
This study is among the pioneering empirical study of crime deterrence utilizing
a large, country-level panel dataset of real offenses that overcomes the challenges posed
by lack of quality data to account for marginal deterrence and crime substitution. Our
key strength is that our empirical framework and data allow us to demonstrate the co-
existence of seemingly contradictory effects, that criminalization may deter some offenses
but yet stimulate more severe violations. This supports the lack of marginal deterrence,
instead of other theories such as brutalization, stigmatization, or defiance (Nagin, 1998;
Kirchga¨ssner, 2011), as one plausible explanation for the previous findings that crime rate
seemed to not respond to, and sometimes even increased in, law enforcement or expected
legal sanction (Shepherd, 2005; Yang and Lester, 2008).
The other strength of this research is the context. All data were collected from the
field. The COC has a fortuitously wide scope, which eases the concern on substitution
of DDOS attack by other cybercrimes because they are similarly criminalized and sanc-
5 Suppose that country A will be attacked with a chance of 0.4 and the attack would comprise 10,000
packets, and that country B will be attacked with a chance of 0.2 and the attack would comprise 20,000
packets. Then, the “crime rate” will be higher in country A than country B (chance of 0.4 vis-a-vis 0.2),
but the expected packets generated for the attack will be identical (both 4,000 packets).
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tioned under the COC. Our data were captured across multiple countries, in real-time,
by an independent third party, and so we observed direct perpetrator actions instead of
processed data by law enforcement agencies or self-reported data from victims. These
parties may have incentives to distort the attacks or the damages inflicted.
Finally, this study contributes to the economics of information security which faces
a paucity of field data especially on real hacker attacks. Our findings suggest that effective
marginal deterrence is important for cybercrimes, which have posed significant challenges
to the criminal justice system because of their intrinsic difference from conventional crimes
in the physical world (Brenner, 2006; Calderoni, 2010). For such an emerging class of
crime, quality empirical evidence is important to informing government policy. This paper
provides such evidence from a field setting.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the related literature
and articulates the challenges faced by previous research. Then, we provide an overview of
the COC. The following section describes our dataset, followed by the empirical framework
and the variables used in the regressions. We then report the estimation results, together
with a battery of identification, falsification, and robustness tests. We conclude the paper
with some implications and suggestions for future research.
I. Related Literature
The prior empirical literature has found contradictory evidence on the deterrence effect of
criminal sanction and general law enforcement. Support for the deterrence effect has been
found for capital punishment and execution (Ehrlich, 1973a, 1977; Shepherd, 2005; Yang
and Lester, 2008), gun-carrying laws (Lott and Mustard, 1997; Bronars and Lott, 1998),
and in enforcement against rape and other sexual offenses (Vaillant and Wolff, 2009),6
but counter evidence has also been observed (see, e.g., Black and Nagin, 1998; Ayres and
6 See, also, the survey by Nagin (1998).
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Donohue, 2003; Donohue, 2004; Kirchga¨ssner, 2011). Such inconsistent findings may be
due to outliers (Black and Nagin, 1998), use of alternative econometric specifications,
sampling, and data (Shepherd, 2005; Yang and Lester, 2008), and psychological mecha-
nisms such as brutalization, stigmatization, and defiance (Sherman, 1993; Nagin, 1998;
Shepherd, 2005; Bouffard and Piquero, 2010; Kirchga¨ssner, 2011).
Perhaps due to lack of delicate offense data, the empirical literature on crime deter-
rence is not well connected to the theoretical analyses. In particular, inspired by Stigler
(1970), a large body of theoretical research analyzes how potential perpetrators decide to
what extent to carry out a harmful act (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). The general insight
is that in some conditions marginal deterrence requires graduated enforcement against
different extents of offenses (Mookherjee and Png, 1992, 1994; Wilde, 1992; Shavell, 1992).
Lacking such graduated enforcement, an enforcement against a harmful act may incen-
tivize perpetrators to switch to more harmful acts. Similarly, lowering the standard of
proof for conviction would lead to criminalization of minor offenses but imposes no addi-
tional penalty on more serious offenses (Ognedal, 2005), and so may encourage determined
perpetrators to escalate their offenses. A failure in marginal deterrence may lead to am-
biguous predictions of the impact of law enforcement, because, while the number of minor
offenses may decrease, the number of major offenses may increase. Hence, prior empirical
studies of deterrence using single definitions of crime rate, such as murder, drink driving,
or drug dealing rates (Nagin, 1998) may not reveal the holistic impact of the enforcement.
This could lead to variously contradictory conclusions.
To test whether perpetrators select the severity of an offense and whether marginal
deterrence is necessary, in addition to crime rate, we also need to observe the magnitude
of the offenses. Studying both crime rate and magnitude could also help test psychological
mechanisms, such as brutalization, stigmatization, or defiance (Nagin, 1998; Kirchga¨ssner,
2011) as alternative explanations for changing crime rates with law enforcement because,
if these psychological explanations were correct, they should apply to all minor and serious
5
offenses (instead of only to serious offenses).
To our knowledge, the only published empirical research that separately considered
crime rate and the magnitude of offense is the study of Ekelund et al. (2006). Using
state-level data between 1995 and 1999, they found that single murder rate had decreased
but multiple murder rate had increased with execution. However, their study had two
limitations. First, their dataset contained only 255 observations across 51 states, and so
it was difficult to control for state or time effects, or to conduct efficient statistical tests.
Second, they studied multiple murder rate but not the actual number of murders. So,
technically, they studied how executions affected different types of criminals (those who
committed single vis-a-vis multiple murders) instead of the actual number of murders
committed after some of the states had imposed execution.
Our unique setting allows us to track the offenses in each country, including their
magnitude. So, we do not face the limitation of Ekelund et al. (2006), and could conduct
elaborate statistical tests to examine the marginal deterrence theory. Further, our studied
enforcement, the COC, is general and applies to all cybercrimes. We could identify how it
affected DDOS attacks without worrying about substitution by other cybercrimes. This
is a unique advantage over the prior literature.
II. The Convention on Cybercrime
Cybercrimes pose new challenges to law enforcement because they often are virtual and
not physically grounded, evolve over time, involve perpetrators and victims from multi-
ple countries, and use information technologies to aggravate their impacts (Katyal, 2001;
Brenner, 2006; Calderoni, 2010). It is often difficult to identify, track, apprehend, and
convict perpetrators in the cyberspace. Hence, new legislations that enhance investiga-
tive power and transcend territorial jurisdictions are necessary for effective enforcement
against cybercrimes.
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Drafted by the Council of Europe and adopted by the Committee of Ministers at
its 109th Session on November 8, 2001, the Convention on Cybercrime is the first interna-
tional legislation against criminal behaviors in the cyberspace. It provides participating
countries with a substantive legal framework to address any actions against the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems (Keyser, 2003; Li, 2007).7
The COC has been open for signature since November 23, 2001, and was first entered
into force by Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania on July 1, 2004. As of
January 2013, 47 countries have signed the COC, and 38 have ratified and enforced it.
Figure 1 presents the signature and ratification of the COC over time.
Figure 1: Signature and Enforcement of the Convention on Cybercrime
The COC has three sets of provisions.8 First, it requires ratifying countries to crim-
inalize a wide set of activities including illegal access and interception, data and system
interference, misuse of computing devices, etc. The definition of crime is loose and so it
covers almost all malicious use of computer data and systems. It also requires ratifying
countries to establish the corporate liability of offenses and the appropriate sanctions.
Second, to facilitate detection, investigation, and prosecution, the COC requires ratify-
ing countries to adopt procedural measures such as expedited preservation of data, and
grants the legal authority to issue data production orders, search, seize, and collect real-
time traffic data, and intercept other related contents. Third, the COC establishes clear
jurisdiction for any cybercrime offenses and outlines the principles for international coop-
eration covering extradition, mutual assistance, information sharing, transborder access
to data, etc. Taken together, these three sets of provisions increase the certainty and
celerity of apprehension through collaborative enforcement across countries, and also the
7 Other than 41 Council of Europe member states, four non-member states including Canada, Japan,
the United States, and South Africa also participated in drafting the COC.
8 The full version of the COC and its explanatory report are available on the Council of Europe’s Web
site, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG.
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penalty through criminalizing computer-related offenses.
Despite the COC’s obvious purpose, it had taken 3 to 11 years for many countries
to progress from signature to ratification, and some (e.g., Canada, Greece, Sweden, and
Turkey) are still in the process of ratification. This could be due to several reasons. First,
to ratify the COC, a signatory country has to adopt legislations that bring its domestic
laws into accord with COC’s penal and procedural requirements (Li, 2007). This could
be a significant undertaking.9 Second, the signatory countries may not have consensus on
the definition of criminal offenses.10 It may take time for a signatory country to deliberate
if it wants to adopt the COC in full. In fact, as of the beginning of January 2013, among
the 38 countries that have ratified the COC, 21 have made reservations concerning the
standard of criminalization, surveillance, mutual legal assistance, etc. Table 1 lists the
countries with reservations on each specific Article of the COC.
Table 1: Reservations on the Convention on Cybercrime
There has been evidence of heightened enforcement against cybercrimes after COC
enforcement. For example, in 2007, a Russian man was convicted for launching DDOS
attacks against Estonia’s government services (Vamosi, 2008). Estonia had enforced the
COC in 2004. In 2010, a programmer in the United States was tried and convicted for his
crippling of rollingstone.com in 2008 with a DDOS attack involving 100,000 computers
worldwide. The United States had enforced the COC in 2007 (Goodin, 2010). In 2011,
9 For example, to comply with the COC, the Finnish legislature had to add new provisions to its Penal
Code concerning information processing systems and possession of instruments used for cybercrimes, and
to establish the corresponding liability (Li, 2007). The Swedish government had to harmonize Swedish
laws regarding punishment of forgery, data interference, child pornography, unlawful use of computers and
monitoring of computer information, and violation of copyright and other related rights. The Japanese
government had also changed its laws to address COC’s data retention and provision requirements and
general requests for cooperation in investigations (Library of Congress, 2009).
10 Article 42 of the COC allows participating countries to provide additional elements and make reser-
vations on Articles 3-4, 6, 9-11, 14, 22, 29, and 41 regarding criminalization, jurisdiction, procedural
provision, and mutual assistance. For example, while data interference as stated in Article 4 of the COC
is considered a criminal offense in Denmark, Germany, and many other Council of Europe member states,
Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Norway, and the United States have reserved the right to criminalize this conduct
only when it causes harm as determined in accordance with applicable domestic laws.
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a German man was convicted for cyber-extortion with threats of DDOS attack against
six online bookmakers. A similar DDOS attack was not against the German law in 2006
(Zorz, 2011). Germany had enforced the COC in 2009.
The COC has also raised concerns among the hacker community. We have traversed
some posts on Hack Forums,11 one of the most popular online forums among the hacker
community. The following are some excerpts:
• “I live in a small town in Romania. Until 1 months ago I thought is no danger in hack-
ing...I’ve got only a warning because I was under 18...then I realized why this happened:
that was because we just joined...European Union and there are new laws in IT...from
now I take care because...it never knows when the cops catch you...,” (posted by user
“the insane eye” in July 2008).
• “...the law follows the same guidelines for all countries in the european union and they’re
very strict about that,” (posted by user “h4ck.in” in April 2010).
• “There are conventions...within European Union borders he can be transported due to the
crime, because of the European Unions conventions about partnership in law,” (posted by
user “Aeternum” in March 2011).
• “...I would rethink your theory on Croatia not having cybercrime laws: The cybercrime
convention is a European directive to which Croatia is a member state...As of 2007, Croa-
tia integrated this into local laws...All of the offences proscribed in the Cybercrime Con-
vention (to which Croatia is a State Party and which has been in force in Croatia since 1
July 2004), with the exception of offences that can generally be described as cyberterror-
ism, are incorporated into the domestic legal framework,” (posted by user “matemisic” in
November 2011).
11 See http://hackforums.net/. In the month of October 2011, Hack Forums had 58,332 unique active
users, 9,320 new threads/topics, and 74,590 new replies. It was the top-ranked Web site in the cate-
gory “Hacking–Chats and Forums” in Alexa, which publishes comprehensive Web traffic analysis on the
Internet. Hack Forum’s global traffic rank was 4,647 in May 2013.
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Posts like the above are common on Hack Forums, which implies that the enforce-
ment of the COC has been well recognized. In fact, it could have been instrumental in
convicting perpetrators. For this study, the disparate timing of COC enforcement by
different countries provides an important degree of freedom to identify its impact on cy-
bercrime deterrence.12 The reservations made by a subset of the countries further serve
as heterogeneous treatments, which also help identify its impact.
III. Data
We obtained a set of random DDOS attack data from the Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA, 2004-2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a). The dataset contains
response data packets sent by DDOS attack victims to spoofed traffic for at least a week-
long period in every quarter between 2004 and 2008.13 As stated in CAIDA (2004-2005):
“When a denial-of-service-attack victim receives attack traffic with spoofed source IP ad-
dresses, the attack victim cannot differentiate between this spoofed traffic and legitimate
requests, so the victim replies to the spoofed source IP addresses. These spoofed IP ad-
dresses were not the actual sources of the attack traffic, so they receive responses to traffic
they never sent. By measuring this response traffic (called backscatter data) to a large
portion of IP addresses (roughly a /8 network), it is possible to estimate a lower bound for
the overall volume of spoofed source denial-of-service attacks occurring on the Internet.”14
12 If all signatory countries had enforced the COC at the same time, then it is difficult to separate its
impact from unobserved time-specific shocks. Other quasi-experimental techniques, such as the regression
discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), may then be necessary. However, the use of such designs
may require truncating the data and so lead to losses of statistical power.
13 Internet traffic is mostly managed by the transmission control protocol (TCP), which uses a three-way
handshake process to establish connections between different Internet hosts. This three-way handshake
process necessarily requires servers (in our context, DDOS attack victims) to respond to every client (in
our context, perpetrator). Most perpetrators would falsify the source Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
to masquerade the origins of their attacks. Therefore, the source IP addresses of attack data packets,
or, equivalently, the destination IP addresses of response data packets sent by DDOS attack victims, are
usually not reliable in identifying or tracing the perpetrators.
14 CAIDA records unsolicited traffic through the UCSD Network Telescope, a globally routed /8 network
comprising approximately 1/256th of all IP addresses. Such traffic can result from a wide range of events,
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For each victim IP address, CAIDA aggregates the backscatter packets by hour. By
locating the country of each victim IP address, we could characterize the DDOS attacks
targeting each country on a daily basis by the number of unique victim IP addresses,
the total number of data packets sent by each victim (to respond to the spoofed attack
packets), and the total time of the attacks. From these data, we could compute the
average intensity of the attacks received by each DDOS victim in each of the studied
countries. Table 2 shows the time periods covered in our dataset. Figure 2 depicts the
distribution of DDOS attacks across countries.
Table 2: Time Periods Covered
Figure 2: Distribution of DDOS Attacks
In addition to the DDOS attack data from CAIDA, we also collected the status
of COC enforcement from the Council of Europe’s Web site, and other demographics
data from the Global Market Information Database (GMID) and the database published
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). We collected country-level indexes of quality
of governance from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and data on some conven-
tional crimes from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the U.S.
Department of State (USDOS). Table 3 presents the sources and descriptive statistics of
our data. Table 4 presents the correlations.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Correlations
including backscatter data from randomly spoofed source DDOS attacks. Because DDOS attack victims
respond to every received request, the number of response packets sent by them to the (spoofed) IP
addresses under the UCSD Network Telescope should correlate highly with the extent of DDOS attacks.
For details of UCSD Network Telescope, see http://www.caida.org/projects/network telescope/. The
use of backscatter data to measure DDOS attack is well established in the field of computing. See, for
example, Moore et al. (2001) and Mao et al. (2006) for applications.
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On average, 335 unique IP addresses in each of the 240 countries were attacked by
DDOS for a combined total of 388 hours per day, but there were substantial variations
across countries. The standard deviations for number of unique victim IP addresses and
total hours of attack were 3,122 and 3,374, close to ten times of the respective means.
Each victim IP address was attacked by an average of 1,411 packets.15 23 countries had
enforced the COC during the sampling window. The countries were less varied in terms
of demographics. In particular, there were around 0.242 Internet users per capita, and
the standard deviation was around 0.245.
IV. Model and Variables
The solid lines in Figure 3 depict the average number of unique IP addresses attacked,
time of attack, and number of packets generated during the attacks per day in each of the
countries that had enforced the COC during each quarter in the sampling window (second
quarter of 2004 to last quarter of 2008). The shaded areas correspond to periods when
the COC was enforced. Apparently, COC enforcement had decreased DDOS attacks in
Bosnia and Herzegovnia, Finland, Norway, and the United States, and had increased
DDOS attacks in Armenia and Iceland. No notable effect was observed in the other
countries, particularly Bulgaria, Denmark, and Netherlands.
Figure 3: DDOS Attacks Over Time
However, the patterns are quite different if we focus on attack intensity. The dotted
lines in Figure 3 plot the average time of attack per victim IP address and the average
number of packets generated per victim IP address over the same period. In Bosnia and
Herzegovnia, Finland, Norway, and the United States, the countries wherein the total
15 Referring to Footnote 14, the CAIDA dataset contains random spoofed source DDOS response packets
recorded on roughly 1/256th of all IP addresses. Most of these 1/256th IP addresses are not allocated by
providers and are widely considered as Internet “black hole” or “darkspace”. This explains the relatively
small number of packets per victim recorded in our data.
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time and number of packets had both decreased after COC enforcement, the average
time and number of packets in fact did not decrease, or even increased slightly, after
the enforcement. Similarly, the average attack rate seemed to have increased slightly in
Bulgaria, Denmark, and Netherlands, and somewhat significantly in Armenia and Iceland.
These trends illustrate the importance to consider multiple measures of “crime rate”when
estimating the impact of law enforcement.
Statistically, the conventional approach to estimating the impact of law enforcement
would be to relate crime rate with the enforcement. In our context, the crime rate can be
measured by potential violation against victims, e.g., the probability of getting attacked.
Hence, we could estimate the following equation:




t + it, (1)
where θit is an indicator denoting whether country i was attacked in day t, Kit is an
indicator that equals 1 if the COC had been enforced in country i in day t, and 0 otherwise,
µi is a vector of dummy variables capturing country-specific effects, τt capture time trends,
and it captures idiosyncratic errors.
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As reported in Table 5, column 1, using a random-effects probit specification, the
effect of COC enforcement was negative but insignificant (γ2 = −0.135, p = 0.21).17 So,
using probability of violation in a country to measure “crime rate”, one might conclude
that COC enforcement was ineffective.
Table 5: Estimations using Differnt Definitions of Crime Rate
However, we can also measure crime rate by number of victims. Let θit be the
16 To capture time trend, for each data collection period in Table 2, we constructed a day index and
included it and its square in the estimation. For example, day(period 1) = 1 for May 26, 2004, day(period
1) = 2 for May 27, 2004, day(period 2) = 1 for August 26, 2004, day(period 2) = 2 for August 27, 2004,
and so on. Altogether, we included 21 periods × 2 = 42 time trend variables.
17 The random-effects probit model is commonly used in the literature because a fixed-effects probit
model may give biased estimates depending on panel sizes (Greene, 2002).
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number of victim IP addresses, divided by number of Internet hosts to adjust for country
size. By estimating a fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, Table 5,
column 2 shows that the effect of COC became significant (γ2 = −0.639, p < 0.01). We
might now conclude that COC enforcement had successfully deterred DDOS attacks.
Yet, suppose that θit denotes the total number of packets generated per Internet
host during the DDOS attacks. Then, Table 5, column 3 shows that the result was strik-
ingly different. The effect of COC enforcement became positive and close to statistically
significant (γ2 = 0.202, p < 0.1). If we let θit be the number of packets per victim IP
address, then the positive effect of COC enforcement would become even more significant
(γ2 = 0.344, p < 0.01). So, the conclusion would now be opposite – COC enforcement
had increased DDOS attacks.18
The problem, clearly, is that linking offenses to law enforcement in a single regres-
sion could account for either the crime rate or magnitude of offense, but not both. To
gain a holisitc view of how law enforcement affected criminal offenses, both the crime
rate and magnitude of offense should be accounted for in the estimation. This is feasible
here as we have an unambiguous measure of intensity – the number of packets generated
against each DDOS attack victim.19
Accordingly, we modeled crime rate as the probability for a country to be attacked
by DDOS on a daily basis. We modeled attack intensity by the average number of packets
generated against each victim IP address.
There was one final caveat. In the CAIDA dataset, the backscatter packets were
18 The estimations in Table 5 did not include any demographic or control variables. As we shall see
later, adding demographic or control variables would not affect the conclusions. We took logarithms for
all dependent variables in Table 5, columns 2 to 4.
19 In principle, the same perpetrator could attack multiple victims at the same time, and so the number
of victim IP addresses may also capture attack intensity (e.g., a single wave of DDOS attack in July
2009 had targeted 27 government agencies and commercial Web sites in Korea and the United States;
see Choi and Markoff 2009). Since we could not ascertain whether the attacks recorded in our dataset
came from the same perpetrators, we avoided using number of victim IP addresses as either attack rate
or intensity measure in the subsequent discussion.
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observed only for countries that were attacked. Some countries may be more/less likely
attacked than others because of systematic factors, one of which could be enforcement of
the COC. Hence, the observation of the backscatter packets maybe non-random, which
implies that there could be systematic omission of observations in the regression with
attack intensity as the dependent variable. It is well known that in such a regression
the conditional expectation of the error term would not equal zero without considering
the possible impact of how the observations were “selected” (Heckman, 1979). The esti-
mated parameters could be biased and inconsistent, leading to invalid statistical inference
(Putsis and Bayus, 2001; Ghose and Han, 2011). Essentially, the non-random inclusion
of countries for DDOS attacks, plausibly due to heterogeneous country characteristics,
could lead to sampling bias.
We addressed such sampling bias through a two-step estimation procedure catered
for panel data proposed by Wooldridge (2001, page 564, Procedure 17.1) and adopted in
previous studies (Putsis and Bayus, 2001; Ghose and Han, 2011). In step 1, we estimated
a random-effects probit “selection” model to examine what affected the probability for a
country to be selected for DDOS attacks. We then calculated the selection bias correction
term from the estimates (Heckman, 1979).20 In step 2, we included such correction term
in a fixed-effects OLS “outcome” model to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of COC
enforcement on DDOS attack intensity.
Econometrically, we formulated the two-step model as follows:








t + uit, (2)
Outcome: rit = β1 + β2Kit + β
′




t + it, (3)
where sit is a binary variable that equals 1 if DDOS attack was observed in country i in
20 The selection bias correction term equals the ratio of the population density function to the cumulative
density function for the relevant choice in the selection equation.
15
day t, rit is the average number of packets per victim IP address in country i in day t,
Kit indicates COC enforcement, xit is a matrix of demographic and control variables, zit
is a set of variables that satisfy the exclusion restriction for the outcome model, Φit is
the selection bias correction term computed from equation (2), σi and µi denote country-
level random and fixed effects, ψt and τt capture time trends (see footnote 16 for their
construction), and uit and it are idiosyncratic random errors.
In equations (2) and (3), sit and rit are correlated because rit is observed and exceeds
0 if and only if sit = 1. The random effects in the selection model, σi, and the fixed effects
in the outcome model, µi, control for unobservable country-level heterogeneities, which
may include culture, socio-economic characteristics, state of development of information
technologies, etc. The time trends, ψt and τt, capture time-related shocks that applied to
all countries, such as any possible seasonality in DDOS attacks. Because Internet hosts
may affect the chance of DDOS attacks but not the intensity of the attacks directed at
each victim, we included in zit the number of Internet hosts and its square as exclusion
restrictions (Wooldridge, 2001).
If COC enforcement was effective, we would expect α2 < 0 and β2 < 0. By contrast,
α2 < 0 and β2 > 0 would imply that the COC had failed to achieve marginal deterrence,
although it might have deterred minor DDOS offenses.21
Following the literature (e.g., Ekelund et al., 2006; Png et al., 2008), we included
relevant demographic and control variables in xit. Specifically, we included gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita, unemployment rate, and number of higher education students
per capita to capture whether a country was attractive for DDOS attack (Korgaonkar
and Wolin, 1999). We also included variables from WGI to control for the effectiveness
21 It is instructive to note that our panel unit was country instead of individual IP address or perpetrator.
We did not use IP address because the CAIDA dataset does not include any information on un-attacked IP
addresses, and so we could not define a complete population if IP address was used as the unit. We did not
conduct the estimation at the perpetrator level because we could not identify the real perpetrators (most
of the destination IP addresses in the backscatter packets were spoofed). Also, each perpetrator could
attack multiple IP addresses in multiple countries simultaneously, which may not satisfy the theoretical
assumptions in most choice models.
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of jurisdictional systems and quality of enforcement agencies. These included control of
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2010).22
The six governance indicators were normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
They spanned over 200 countries and varied on a yearly basis.
Specific to the context of cybercrime, we controlled for the influence of information
technology infrastructure and diffusion in each country by including, on per-capita ba-
sis, the number of Internet users, number of integrated services digital network (ISDN)
subscribers, and availability of digital telephone lines. We included land area per capita
to approximate the average physical distance between people. These variables may affect
the risk of exposure to computer crime victimization.
We constructed all demographic and control variables, except the governance indi-
cators, in per-capita terms, and used the double-log specification as it often fits economic
data better (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 197-200).23 Other than group-wise heteroskedasticity
which is commonly observed in panel data, our dataset was subject to cross-sectional or
spatial interdependencies due to the global nature of cyber attacks (Kim et al., 2012).24
22 According to Kaufmann et al. (2010, page 4), Control of corruption captures “perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests”. Government effectiveness
captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”. Political stability and absence of
violence/terrorism captures “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism”.
Regulatory quality captures “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. Rule of law captures
“perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence”. Voice and accountability captures “perceptions of the extent to which
a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media”.
23 Where necessary, we added 1 before any size adjustment to avoid logarithm of zeros. For brevity, we
do not mention the logarithms in discussing the subsequent results.
24 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test in the outcome model rejected the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity across countries (χ2 = 3, 661.59, p < 0.01). All three tests proposed by Frees (1995),
Friedman (1937), and Pesaran (2004) rejected the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependency among
at least 45 countries that had been attacked every day in our sampling window (all p < 0.01). The average
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Accordingly, in all estimations of the outcome model, we used spatial correlation con-
sistent standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which should be robust to general
cross-sectional and temporal interdependencies.
V. Results
We first estimated the two-step model in equations (2) and (3) by excluding all explana-
tory variables except COC enforcement and the country and day effects. This specifi-
cation allowed us to avoid pruning DDOS attack data because of missing observations
on some demographic and control variables.25 We used the average number of packets
generated per victim IP address as the intensity measure in the outcome model. As re-
ported in Table 6, column 1, the coefficient of COC enforcement was negative but not
statistically significant in the selection model (α2 = −0.135, p = 0.21). It was positive
and statistically significant in the outcome model (β2 = 0.715, p < 0.01).
Table 6: Main Estimation Results
We next estimated another specification which replaced COC enforcement by the
demographic and control variables. Because of missing data in some of these variables,
the sample size decreased by more than 60%. As reported in Table 6, column 2, countries
with higher GDP per capita tended to be more intensely attacked, possibly because such
countries had higher incomes and so were more attractive to perpetrators (Korgaonkar
and Wolin, 1999). Similarly, countries with more higher education students had a higher
chance of getting attacked, and the attacks were more intensive too (in the sense of
involving more packets per victim IP address). If we assume that perpetrators often
launch DDOS attacks against domestic targets, then the positive effects here could be due
cross-sectional correlation of the regression residuals was 0.130.
25 The demographic data of many countries, particularly those without an independent sovereign state,
such as Cook Islands, Isle of Man, British Virgin Islands, etc., and those with less developed economies,
such as Honduras, Montenegro, Vietnam, etc., were not available.
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to better educated people having more knowledge about computing and cyber attacks.26
By contrast, unemployment rate had a positive effect only in the selection model. This is
consistent with unemployed people having lower opportunity cost of time but not better
skills or knowledge to launch intensive attacks.27
The availability of digital main lines and number of ISDN subscribers had positive
effects in the outcome model. This seemed plausible given that organizations were more
likely to subscribe to digital main lines and ISDN, and were more prone to DDOS attacks
too. Digital main lines and ISDN could also provide higher data transfer speeds and
so could handle more attack packets. The average land area per capita was negatively
correlated with DDOS attack intensity, possibly because it was more difficult to flood a
target with many packets when the distance between the attacking and victim computers
increases (and so the attacking and backscatter packets may have to go through more
intermittent “hops”).
Among the six governance indicators, control of corruption had a negative effect in
the selection model. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism had a negative
effect in the selection model but a positive effect in the outcome model. Regulatory
quality had negative effects, and rule of law had positive effects in both the selection and
outcome models. While some of these results may seem counter-intuitive, perpetrators
could have substituted other criminal activities in the physical world by cybercrimes,
particularly when such criminal activities were more regulated or suppressed in countries
with better governance quality. So, it could well be possible for some of the governance
indicators to be positively correlated with DDOS attacks.
Table 6, column 3 presents the estimation results of the full model, which included
the COC enforcement and all demographic and control variables. The results were largely
26 In reality, a smart perpetrator can avoid getting caught by exploiting “zombie” computers to launch
the DDOS attack from other countries.
27 Prior research has also found a positive correlation between unemployment rate and violations. See,
for example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001).
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consistent with the earlier specifications. COC enforcement had an insignificant negative
effect in the selection model (α2 = −0.192, p = 0.15) but a statistically significant positive
effect in the outcome model (β2 = 0.511, p < 0.01). By averaging the predicted proba-
bilities across all observations, the marginal effect of COC enforcement in reducing the
attack probability in the selection model was −0.025 (s.e. 0.018), which was economically
small and statistically insignificant. The elasticity in the outcome model was, however,
0.511 (s.e. 0.065). So, enforcing the COC increased the average intensity of attack by
51.1%. This was statistically and economically significant.28
To buttress our findings, we considered alternative DDOS attack motivations. In
general, perpetrators could inflict damage on a victim by two means. First, they could
flood the victim with many packets persistently in the hope of causing a long downtime.
Our dependent variable in the outcome model, the average number of packets generated
per victim IP address, should capture such motivation. Second, perpetrators could launch
focused attacks in a short period of time in the hope of successfully incapacitating the
victim. To capture this motivation, we could measure attack intensity by the number of
packets generated per victim IP address per hour. This should capture the concentration
of DDOS attacks per fixed unit of time.
Table 6, column 4 reports the results of estimating the new outcome model, using
the revised intensity measure as the dependent variable. The results were consistent with
those in column 3. COC enforcement had a strong positive effect on attack intensity,
with an elasticity of 51.9% (s.e. 5.8%).
Because some perpetrators may concurrently attack multiple IP addresses, another
measure for attack intensity would be, simply, the number of packets generated by the
DDOS attacks per hour (regardless of number of victims). Table 6, column 5 reports the
28 To test the exclusion restrictions, as an experiment we included the number of Internet host and its
square as independent variables in the outcome model and found that, indeed, they were not statistically
significant. For brevity, we do not report the results here.
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results. The elasticity of COC enforcement in the outcome model was 49.3% (s.e. 6.2%),
very close to the previous estimates.
We also checked the robustness of our findings by modeling time specific effects using
176 day dummy variables instead of the 42 trend variables. Table 6, column 6 shows that
the results were largely similar. The effect of COC enforcement was insignificant in the
selection model, with a marginal effect of −0.015 (s.e. 0.009) on the predicted probability
for a country to be attacked. Its effect continued to be significant and positive in the
outcome model. The elasticity was around 43% (s.e. 6.7%).
Finally, to critically assess whether our results were related to marginal deterrence,
we exploited heterogeneous treatments, that some countries had made reservations on the
COC concerning the standard of criminalization, surveillance, or mutual legal assistance
(see Table 1). These reservations may increase the standard of proof for conviction, which
tends to increase the expected sanction of serious offenses relative to minor offenses, an
essential requirement of marginal deterrence (Shavell, 1992; Mookherjee and Png, 1994;
Ognedal, 2005). Accordingly, if the effect of COC enforcement reported above were due
to lack of marginal deterrence, then we would expect its effect on DDOS attack intensity
to be smaller in countries that had declared more reservations.
We added the number of reservations interacted with COC enforcement as an in-
dependent variable in both the selection and outcome models. As reported in Table 6,
column 7, indeed, the coefficient of numebr of reservations interacted with COC enforce-
ment in the outcome model was −0.137 (p < 0.01). For each additional reservation on
the COC, the countries tended to be attacked by 13.7% (s.e. 3.3%) fewer packets. This
indicated that it was the lack of marginal deterrence that caused an increased attack
intensity in countries that had enforced the COC.
Overall, we preferred the (“main”) specification in Table 6, column 3. It used an
unambiguous measure of attack intensity and a simple structure to model country-level
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heterogeneities and time trends.29
A. Identification Tests
One concern of using observational data in deterrence research is reverse causation, that
the criminal activity might have motivated the government to strengthen law enforce-
ment (Ehrlich and Brower, 1987). In our context, the enforcement of the COC could be
endogenous – a country might ratify the COC because it experienced more cyber attacks,
and so there could have been an a priori positive correlation between COC enforcement
and DDOS attacks at the country level.
Several reasons suggest that such endogeneity may not be of major concern here.
First, if COC enforcement responded to DDOS attacks, then we would expect its corre-
lations with both the probability and magnitude of the attacks to be positive. This was
not the case in Table 6. In fact, as we shall see later, COC enforcement was negatively
correlated with the number of victim IP addresses.
Second, as we reviewed in Section II, the COC does not address crime magnitude,
and so there is no good reason to believe that its impact would be specifically on crime
magnitude but not the rate of offenses. In fact, as the COC criminalizes an entire new
class of crimes, if it were endogenous, it would more likely correlate positively with the
probability or rate of offenses, instead of magnitude.
Third, if the positive correlation of COC enforcement and DDOS attack intensity
was spurious and caused by reverse causation, then we should observe relatively flat
DDOS attack rate and intensity patterns for each country in Figure 3 over time. The
only variations in the attack rates and intensity should be along the vertical axis across
countries. This is not the case in Figure 3. In many countries, the DDOS attack patterns
29 The selection bias correction term was close to statistically significant (ρ = −0.065, p = 0.06),
indicating that adjusting for non-random sampling may help obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of
COC enforcement on DDOS attack intensity.
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changed sharply before and after the COC was enforced.
Statistically, the country fixed effects were orthogonal to COC enforcement in the
outcome model, and so should have extracted the country-level variations in DDOS at-
tacks. They should suffice to address the endogeneity caused by reverse causation.
We buttress our analysis with two identification tests. First, we considered the per-
capita number of professional judges or magistrates in a country. If COC enforcement
was endogenous and caused by the prevailing significance of cybercrimes, then we would
expect countries that were more bothered by cybercrimes to also increase resources on the
criminal justice system. In particular, such countries would need more judges to convict
perpetrators. So, the correlation between COC enforcement and DDOS attack intensity
should be higher in countries with more judges.
By contrast, if the effect of COC enforcement was related to deterrence and so
the expected marginal cost of violations, then we would expect its effect to be smaller in
countries with more judges, because the chance for perpetrators to be tried and convicted
would be higher in such countries.
We obtained yearly data on the number of professional judges or magistrates from
UNODC,30 and entered it and its interaction with COC enforcement as additional in-
dependent variables. As reported in Table 7, column 1, the effect of COC enforcement
continued to be insignificant in the selection model and significant in the outcome model.31
The number of professional judges or magistrates was insignificant in both models. Im-
portantly for our identification strategy, the interaction of number of professional judges
or magistrates with COC enforcement was negative, −0.778 (s.e. 0.171), and statistically
30 According to UNODC, “professional judges or magistrates” means both full-time and part-time of-
ficials as at 31 December of every year authorized to hear civil, criminal and other cases, including in
appeal courts, and to make dispositions in a court of law. It also includes authorized associate judges
and magistrates.
31 For brevity, we do not report the demographic and control variables in this and all subsequent tables.
The coefficients of these variables were largely consistent in terms of signs, magnitude, and significance
with those reported in Table 6.
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significant. This served as a sharp test that the effect of COC enforcement was caused
by its effect on deterrence instead of endogeneity.
Table 7: Identification Tests
Our second identification strategy exploited the heterogeneous Internet infrastruc-
ture across countries. As cybercrimes, particularly DDOS attack, involve transmission
of packets between Internet hosts, a country’s Internet connectivity with the rest of the
world would directly empower or constrain international cyber attacks. We distinguished
countries by (external) Internet connectivity measured by the total number of business
relationships between autonomous systems (AS).32
We expected DDOS attacks targeting countries with more external AS relation-
ships to respond more sharply to COC enforcement because it is easier to reach and so
attack the hosts in such countries. The consideration of external Internet connectivity
is particularly relevant for DDOS attack because its success and damage depend greatly
on whether perpetrators could take control of a “zombie” network, which often comprises
computers globally. Further, by design, the COC enhances international collaboration on
enforcement against cybercrimes, and so it should apply particularly to countries whose
environments favor cyber attacks from global sources (i.e., countries with good Internet
connectivity with the rest of the world). As reported in Table 4, the correlations between
external AS connections with the other country characteristics were mostly very small.
So, it seemed reasonably exogenous in our setting.
We included the number of external AS connections and its interaction with COC
32 We obtained AS data from CAIDA (2008b). The Internet consists of thousands of AS, each of which is
a connected group of networks labeled by a unique AS number and belongs to a unique country. Although
the Internet hosts within an AS uses a single and well defined routing policy for all Internet traffic, we
could build a direct connection between Internet hosts in different AS only if the business relationship
between the two AS has been established (the easiest way to understand AS is to treat it as a network
managed by an Internet service provider). Therefore, the total number of business relationships between
a country’s AS with other countries’ AS directly reflects the country’s Internet connectivity. Starting
from 2004, CAIDA provides a snapshot on the business relationship for each pair of AS on a monthly
basis. By mapping each AS number to its country, we could calculate the total number of relationships
between a country’s AS with other countries’ AS on a monthly basis.
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enforcement as additional independent variables. The results are reported in Table 7,
column 2. The effect of COC enforcement became insignificant, and the external AS
connections had significant positive effects in both the selection and outcome models.
Importantly for our identification strategy, the interaction of external AS connections
with COC enforcement had a positive and significant effect, 0.110 (s.e. 0.028), only in the
outcome model. This did not support the endogeneity or reverse causation explanation,
and seemed inconsistent with other theories such as brutalization, stigmatization, or
defiance too (all of which predict positive effects of COC enforcement in both the selection
and outcome models irregardless of external AS connections). The evidence supported
the lack of marginal deterrence for major offenses particularly in countries well-connected
to the outside world.
B. Falsification
To validate the effect of COC enforcement, that it was specific to cybercrime deterrence
instead of spurious correlations, we conducted several falsification exercises. First, from
USDOS, we constructed a binary variable of whether a country was classified as a “money
laundering or financial crimes country/jurisdiction”within our sampling window. We used
it as the dependent variable in a random-effects probit regression. As reported in Table
8, column 1, the effect of COC enforcement was negative but insignificant.
Table 8: Falsification Tests
Next, from UNODC, we collected yearly statistics on theft, numbers of persons
prosecuted and convicted, and number of untried/pre-trial persons held in each coun-
try.33 Theft is a close physical counterpart to DDOS attack as it also deprives a person
33 According to UNODC, “theft” means depriving a person or organisation of property without force
with the intent to keep it. It excludes burglary, housebreaking, robbery, and theft of a motor vehicle.
“Persons prosecuted” means alleged offenders prosecuted by means of an official charge, initiated by the
public prosector or the law enforcement agency responsible for prosecution. “Persons convicted” means
persons found guilty by any legal body authorized to pronounce a conviction under national criminal
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or organisation of property. The prosecution and conviction data included people who
committed white-collar crimes, which are good physical counterparts to cybercrimes. The
number of untried/pre-trial persons held may include those committing relatively minor
offenses, possibly cyber or general white-collar crimes as well.
We used each of these statistics as the dependent variable in the outcome model as
specified in equation (3), keeping the same indepedendent variables except the selection
bias correction term.34 As reported in Table 8, column 2, the effect of COC enforcement
was not statistically significant in any of these regressions. So, the effect of COC was spe-
cific to DDOS attack, a kind of cybercrime that it targets, but not to other conventional
crimes, which it does not target.35
Finally, we tested the specificity of the treatment effect by replacing COC enforce-
ment with COC signature. Because a country that signed the COC without ratification
practically had not enforced it, the signature should not affect perpetrators’ actions. On
the other hand, COC enforcement and signature were necessarily correlated and should
be driven by common factors (e.g., international politics, being members of trade organi-
zations and unions, etc.). If the effect of COC enforcement identified above were caused
by some of these other factors instead of cybercrime deterrence, then we would expect
the effect of COC signature to be also significant.
law, whether or not the conviction was later upheld. “Persons held” excludes non-criminal prisoners held
for administrative purposes, including persons held pending investigation into their immigration status
and foreign citizens without a legal right to stay held prior to removal.
34 It was infeasible to estimate the selection model for these crimes because all countries had recorded a
positive number of offenses in every year. Because it was unlikely for these conventional crimes to exhibit
spatial autocorrelation, we clustered the standard errors by country (instead of using spatial correlation
consistent standard errors) in these four regressions.
35 Because the statistics on the conventional crimes were available for fewer countries, the insignificant
results could also be due to sample size (cf. those reported in Table 6). We repeated the estimation of
the main specification in Table 6, column 3 by including only the countries whereby the statistics on the
conventional crimes were available. The sample size became much smaller (only 5,727 observations), even
than those reported in Table 8, columns 1 and 2, but COC enforcement continued to be significant in
the outcome model (β2 = 0.730, p < 0.01). So, sample size did not matter. In another set of falsification
tests, we used assult, burglary, kidnapping, and robbery as the dependent variables. The effect of COC
enforcement was always statistically insignificant. Because the nature of these crimes are different from
cybercrimes, we do not report the results of these tests.
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As reported in Table 8, column 3, the effect of COC signature was insignificant in
both the selection and outcome models. So, we concluded that our findings in Table 6
were caused by failure of the COC in achieving marginal deterrence, not other spurious
trends or unobserved factors.
C. Robustness
We checked the robustness of our findings in multiple ways. First, because many countries
did not enforce the COC, to show that the effect of COC enforcement was not due to
group-common characteristics, we repeated the estimation of the main specification by
confining the sample to only countries that had enforced the COC. The identification of
the COC effect would then rely solely on variations in DDOS attacks over time (instead
of across the panel unit, country). Compared with the samples used in Table 6, the test
using this restricted sample should be more stringent.36
Second, we conducted another estimation using only member countries of the Coun-
cil of Europe. These countries were more likely to enforce the COC, and they may share
common characteristics too. If some of these characteristics were correlated with the
COC, then its effect could be spurious. Third, we checked whether the effect of the COC
was persistent over time by lagging the time of enforcement by 6 and 12 months. Fourth,
to ensure that our results were not rendered by outliers, in the next two estimations we
excluded, respectively, the countries that were attacked in only one day, and the countries
that were attacked in every day in the sampling window.
Table 9 reports the estimation results. The effect of COC enforcement was very
consistent – always insignificant in the selection model and significant in the outcome
model. The elasticity of COC enforcement in the outcome model was stable, ranging
from 47% to 56%, except in the specification excluding the frequently attacked countries,
36 This also served as another powerful test to rule out the reverse causation explanation.
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where it was larger (β2 = 1.076, p < 0.01). Apparently, the failure of the COC in achieving
marginal deterrence was more pronounced in less frequently victimized countries.
Table 9: Robustness
Finally, we tested if the effect of COC enforcement was actually due to unobserved
country-specific developments over time. We included the interaction of each of the 23
COC country dummy variables with the 42 time trend variables in the regressions. With
these 23 × 42 = 966 country-specific time trends, the random-effects probit selection
model failed to converge, so we were not able to compute the selection bias correction
term. However, the coefficient of COC enforcement in a fixed-effects OLS model remained
similar without the selection bias correction term, with (β2 = 0.565, p < 0.05) or without
the country-time trends (β2 = 0.484, p < 0.01). For brevity, we do not report the results
of this regression.37
D. Heterogeneous Effects
We next ask the question: Was the failure in marginal deterrence consistent across coun-
tries? Could it have been driven by some countries that had less effective or less credible
enforcement against cybercrimes? We conducted two tests to answer this question. First,
we repeated estimating the main specification by excluding the 23 countries that had en-
forced the COC one-by-one. Figure 4 plots the coefficients of COC enforcement and their
95% confidence intervals. In the selection model, the COC enforcement effect mostly lied
around −0.2, and the 95% confidence intervals almost always enclosed zero. By contrast,
in the outcome model, the COC enforcement effect mostly lied around 0.5, and the 95%
confidence interval always lied above zero. So, the increase in DDOS attack intensity
37 We also plotted the least-squares predicted daily average number of packets per victim IP address
captured by the country-specific time trends. The country-specific time trends had captured the varia-
tions in DDOS attack intensity over time in each of the COC countries well. For brevity, we omit the
graphs here. In another robustness check, we added the interactions of continents (Asia, Europe, Africa,
etc.) and the time trends. The results were similar.
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with COC enforcement was not caused by a specific outlier.
Figure 4: Consistency of the COC Effect
Second, we estimated another model with a full parameterization of COC enforce-
ment, allowing its coefficient to differ across countries. For brevity, we do not report the
regression results. Instead, Table 10 tabulates the estimated effects of COC enforcement
in each of the 23 countries in the outcome model.38
Table 10: Country-Specific Effect
The coefficients of COC enforcement were negative for seven countries, but only
two of them were statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficients were positive for
16 countries, and 10 of them were statistically significant. Among these 10 countries, the
coefficient of COC enforcement ranged from 0.687 to 2.266. Hence, the effect of COC
enforcement on DDOS attack intensity did seem to vary across countries, but the overall
effect tended to be positive.
VI. Was it Really Deterrence?
We found robust positive impact of COC enforcement on DDOS attack intensity (mea-
sured by packets per victim IP address). We interpret this finding as failure in marginal
deterrence. To lend further confidence in our conclusion, we should show that perpe-
trators were indeed rational, that they cared about the expected benefit of a successful
DDOS attack, and the expected cost of being apprehended and convicted.
Given the scale of our study it is difficult to draw direct evidence about perpetrator
motivation. However, it has been increasingly recognized that cyber criminals are mo-
tivated by financial incentives – for example, Kaspersky recorded that in Q2 2011, the
38 All country-specific COC enforcement coefficients were insignificant in the selection model.
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majority of DDOS attacks were directed at online shopping and gaming Web sites, and
also, banks and stock exchanges (Mansfield-Devine, 2011). Attacks against government
sites comprised only 1% of all DDOS attacks.
We also traversed some posts in Hack Forums (see footnote 11) to explore hacker
motivations. The following are some relevant posts:
• “Has anyone here ever successfully extorted money from a business or organization by
performing DDoS attacks...I know it’s illegal in most Western countries but I live in
Eastern Europe where cybercrime laws are very lax...It seems like a good way to monetize
a botnet,” (posted by user “vladmir” in September 2010).
• “this is the official european unions site right?? ...do they run like security agencies like
the CIA and FBI...,” (posted by user “mrjokerq8” in November 2011).
• “avoid your own country* avoid good friends of your own country* avoid countries you
may want to go live in* if you are living within the european union it is preferable not to
hack into countries that are members of the union...,” (posted by user “crackerjacks” in
July 2011).
• “fact is if youre using your net for extortion, cc fraud, industrial espionage or espionage
for that matter you are more likely to have government agencys look into you...as to which
are safer i would say html...what you do however need to do is daisy chain them. choosing
ones which delete there logs every week or so. its best to have them in different countrys
with different languages...,” (posted by user “Facebook marketer” in October 2010).
• “Difficult but not impossible, Also depends upon the intensity of your illegality,” (posted
by user “Transient” in May 2011).
• “more packets and longer time will result in a more powerful ddos...,” (posted by user
“alchemist1221” in December 2010).
30
• “Nah....a good price is 10 cents per bot. (OP: you probably want more bots to have a
chance of DDOSing a decent),” (posted by user “Unreality” in August 2010).
Evidently, some perpetrators would weigh the benefit of DDOS attack against the
expected cost, particularly the cost of apprehension and legal sanction. The enforcement
against cybercrimes may deter some novice perpetrators (as the first two posts above
imply), but may not deter sophisticated or committed perpetrators who may then seek
means to lower their risks (as the third and fourth posts show) while continuing, or even
escalating, their attacks (as the last three posts imply).
VII. Implications
The results in Table 6 show that enforcing the COC increased the attack intensity by
51.1% (s.e. 6.5%). How significant was this impact at the national level? To answer this
question, we regressed the number of victim IP addresses, packets generated, and hours of
attack per Internet host on COC enforcement and reservation, and the demographic and
control variables. As reported in Table 11, COC enforcement had decreased the number
of victims by 26% (s.e. 4.3%) and hours of attack by 22% (s.e. 4.4%), but increased the
packets generated by 71% (s.e. 9.0%). In general, the reservations tended to weaken the
impact of the enforcement. This is consistent with their purpose.
Table 11: COC Enforcement: National Impacts
In the United States, there were roughly 2 million unique victim IP addresses and
a total of 11.5 million hours of attack during the 177 days in our dataset. The estimates
in Table 11 suggest that enforcing the COC could potentially have prevented hundreds of
thousands of IP addresses from being attacked, or reduced millions of hours of attacking
time in those 177 days.
A research commissioned by Verisign had found that among 19 companies with
annual revenues exceeding one billion dollars, the loss in revenue due to DDOS attacks
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could range from 0.2 to 10 million dollars per hour (Forrester Consulting, 2009). A recent
survey by HP Enterprise Security had also found that the annualized cost of DDOS attacks
per incident was around $172,238 (Ponemon Institute, 2012). It is reasonable to expect
that most of the backscatter data observed in our dataset did not arise from successful
DDOS attacks, and also, some of the attacked hosts may not be commercial, or could
be of substantially smaller scales of operation. Even with these provisions, the potential
saving realized from COC enforcement seems large.
However, COC enforcement was also correlated with DDOS attack packets. Because
the probability of successful DDOS attacks increases with the number of packets launched
for the attacks (Forrester Consulting, 2009), COC enforcement might have increased the
chance for some systems to be incapacitated as well. This tends to offset the benefit of
reduced number of victims and hours of attacks. On balance, the effect of enforcing the
COC on the losses caused by DDOS attacks is ambiguous.39
To deter serious offenses, a well known suggestion has been to increase the marginal
cost of committing serious offenses relative to minor offenses, so that utility-maximizing
perpetrators would switch to less harmful offenses (Stigler, 1970). One way to facilitate
this “marginal cost difference” is to raise the standard of proof for conviction (Ognedal,
2005), so that the marginal cost of committing minor offenses is decreased. Our results in
Table 11 show, however, that this approach has a well-expected disadvantage – although
it successfully discouraged serious offenses, it might have reduced the effectiveness of
the enforcement. Overall, in the case of DDOS attack, raising such standard of proof
through reservations on the COC had led to more victims and longer hours of attack at
the national level. Hence, the evidence suggests that a better way to facilitate marginal
deterrence for a new class of crimes would be to impose graduated penalties (Mookherjee
39 Note that there could be substitutions in DDOS attacks across countries. After a country had
enforced the COC, instead of not carrying out the attacks, perpetrators may switch to attacking targets
in other countries. This may raise the observed DDOS attack rates and intensity in countries that had
not enforced the COC, and so bias against our findings.
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and Png, 1992, 1994; Wilde, 1992; Shavell, 1992), perhaps on every well-defined level of
offenses, instead of reducing the sanction for minor offenses.
If we assume that DDOS attacks are mostly targeted at organizations, especially,
large organizations,40 then our results imply that enforcing the COC had re-distributed
the risks among potential victims. The risks of large organizations, such as the govern-
ment or multinational corporations, may become higher, whereas the risk of “smaller”
parties, such as individuals or small and medium sized enterprises, may become smaller.
Future enforcement of new laws, especially on the cyberspace, should carefully weigh the
balance of interest between these different parties. One possible solution is to combine
law enforcement such as the COC with precautions at the victim side. When attack is tar-
geted, facilitating victim precaution would be effective especially for high-value victims,
such as large organizations (Png and Wang, 2009). The intuition is that their elasticity
with respect to the facilitation of the precaution will be higher, so they would more likely
undertake additional efforts to protect their systems.41
Finally, similar to Vaillant and Wolff (2009), our findings also cast doubt on the
broken windows theory – at least in the case of DDOS attack, criminalizing all offenses
(including the minor ones) did not make perpetrators better behaved. There seems to be
a need for more targeted deterrence against major offenses.
40 Several reasons suggest that utility-maximing perpetrators would want to attack large organizations.
First, if the attack is motivated by monetary gain, for example, cyber extortion, then such organizations
are more likely to have the financial resources to pay the perpetrators (and they would be more likely to
pay too since their opportunity cost of not paying is higher). Second, if the attack is motivated by pride,
then incapacitating the site of a prominent organization, such as the government, would certainly give a
higher sense of achievement to the perpetrator. Third, if the motivation is defiance, then attacking large
organizations would create more visible impacts.
41 Another advantage of victim precaution is that it may help alleviate the “weakest link” problem in
interdependent systems (Varian, 2004), which may dissuade perpetrators from displacing cyber attacks
to other countries, a trend identified in Kim et al. (2012).
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VIII. Concluding Remarks
This paper presents the first attempt to demonstrate the challenge in achieving marginal
deterrence using a large-scale dataset from the field. We find that enforcement of the
Convention on Cybercrime had motivated undeterred perpetrators to launch more serious
offenses. We also find that reservations weakened the effect of the COC, and so could
lead to more effective marginal deterrence. However, such reservations also tended to
increase the number of victims and total time of attack. We suggest that the best path
to marginal deterrence is to impose graduated enforcement, setting different penalties for
different extents of offenses. We do recognize, however, that this could be challenging in
the cyberspace because new crimes emerge over time. Lacking effective means to impose
marginal deterrence, another possible solution is to combine law enforcement such as the
COC with precautions at the victim side.
Our dataset started from the second quarter of 2004 and ended in the last quarter
of 2008. While this window may not capture the most recent developments of DDOS,
it does carry the advantage of excluding some politically-motivated attacks, such as the
cyber warfare between North Korea and South Korea and the United States in 2009, or
between China and the United States, and Taiwan and Phillippines in 2013. Such warfare
may be motivated by political ideology or patriotism, and so the economic cost/benefit
tradeoff of DDOS attack and marginal deterrence may not apply.
Although our study was conducted in the setting of an international convention on
cybercrime, and for only one particular offense, viz., DDOS, our results seem generalizable
to other contexts where marginal deterrence matters.
The most pressing issue for future work is to explore the best means for marginal
deterrence, given that imposing graduated penalty is not always feasible. Perhaps having
a better understanding of the perceived sanction risk and the actual implementation of
the enforcement would be helpful for policy design (Nagin, 1998). It would also be helpful
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to buttress our findings with the attack patterns of other cybercrimes (e.g., distribution
of malware), and if we could identify perpetrators.42 Finally, under the COC framework,
it is worthwhile to investigate if facilitating victim precautions could help reduce the rate
and intensity of cyber attacks in an empirical setting.
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(a) Number of victim IP addresses per Internet host per day 
 
FIGURE 2 – DISTRIBUTION OF DDOS ATTACKS 
 
Note: Darker shade corresponds to more DDOS attacks.  Internet host data are unavailable for North Korea, 













































































(c) Number of packets generated per IP address per day 
 
FIGURE 2 – DISTRIBUTION OF DDOS ATTACKS (CONTINUED) 
 
Note: Darker shade corresponds to more DDOS attacks.  Internet host data are unavailable for North Korea, 
























FIGURE 3 – DDOS ATTACKS OVER TIME 
 
Note: The figures show the average DDOS attack per day in each quarter from the second quarter of 2004 to the 
last quarter of 2008.  The trends are not plotted on the same scale and so should be examined separately.  The 
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FIGURE 3 – DDOS ATTACKS OVER TIME (CONTINUED) 
 
Note: The figures show the average DDOS attack per day in each quarter from the second quarter of 2004 to the 
last quarter of 2008.  The trends are not plotted on the same scale and so should be examined separately.  The 
shaded areas correspond to periods after the COC was enforced. 
  






(b) Coefficients of COC Enforcement in the Outcome Model 
 
FIGURE 4 – CONSISTENCY OF THE COC EFFECT 
 
Note: The horizontal axis lists the specific countries excluded in each set of regression.   
AL – Albania, AM – Armenia, BA – Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG – Bulgaria, CY – Cyprus, DK – Denmark, 
EE – Estonia, FI – Finland, FR – France, HR – Croatia, HU – Hungary, IS – Iceland, IT – Italy, LT – Lithuania, 
LV – Latvia, MK – Republic of Macedonia, NL – Netherlands, NO – Norway, RO – Romania, SI – Slovenia, 
























Austria*         √  
Azerbaijan*  √ √      √  
Belgium*        √   
Bulgaria       √    
Denmark    √   √    
Finland      √ √    
France    √    √   
Germany* √  √      √  
Hungary    √       
Iceland    √       
Japan*   √ √  √  √ √  
Latvia         √  
Lithuania  √       √  
Montenegro*    √   √    
Norway   √    √  √  
Slovakia  √       √  
Switzerland*   √ √   √  √  
Ukraine   √ √       
U.K. *    √    √ √  
U.S.   √ √ √ √   √  √ 
* Ratified the Convention on Cybercrime after 2008, the end of sampling window in this study.  
 
Note: Article 3 – Illegal interception; Article 4 – Data interference; Article 6 – Misuse of devices;  
Article 9 – Offences related to child pornography; Article 10 – Infringements of copyright and related rights; 
Article 11 – Attempt and aiding or abetting; Article 14 – Scope of procedural provisions;  
Article 22 – Jurisdiction; Article 29 – Expedited preservation of stored computer data;  
Article 41 – Federal clause. 
 
  
TABLE 2 – TIME PERIODS COVERED 
Year Quarter Period Number 
of days 
2004 2 5/26/2004 – 6/3/2004 9 
 3 8/26/2004 – 9/3/2004 9 
 4 11/24/2004 – 12/2/2004 9 
    
2005 1 2/23/2005 – 3/3/2005 9 
 2 5/25/2005 – 6/2/2005 9 
 3 8/24/2005 – 9/1/2005 9 
 4 11/23/2005 – 12/1/2005 9 
    
2006 1 2/22/2006 – 3/2/2006 9 
 2 5/24/2006 – 6/1/2006 9 
 3 8/23/2006 – 8/31/2006 9 
 4 11/22/2006 – 11/30/2006 9 
    
2007 1 1/8/2007 – 1/11/2007 
2/21/2007 – 3/1/2007 
13 
 2 5/23/2007 – 5/31/2007 9 
 3 8/22/2007 – 8/30/2007 9 
 4 11/20/2007 – 11/29/2007 10 
    
2008 1 2/20/2008 – 2/28/2008 
3/18/2008 – 3/19/2008 
11 
 2 5/21/2008 – 5/29/2008 9 
 3 8/20/2008 –8/28/2008 9 
 4 11/12/2008 – 11/19/2008 8 





TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable N 
No. of 
countries Unit Mean Std. dev. Min Max Source Form 
Convention on Cybercrime (daily data) 
Signature 42,480 240  1 = signed;  0 = not signed 0.17 0.38 0 1 COE  
Enforcement 42,480 240  
1 = enforce; 
0 = not enforced 
0.06 0.23 0 1 COE  
Reservation 42,480 240 Number of articles 0.06 0.40 0 6 COE  
DDOS Attack (daily data) 
Number of packets 42,480 240 ×1,000 450.86 6,326.03 0 456,948.30 CAIDA log 
Hours of attack 42,480 240  388.39 3,374.49 0 94,071 CAIDA log 
Number of victim IP addresses 42,480 240  334.63 3,122.39 0 91,751 CAIDA log 
Packets per victim IP address 23,263 196 ×1,000 1.41 92.60 1 13,974.54 Computed log 
Packets per victim IP address 
per hour 23,263 196 ×1,000 0.46 31.36 1 4,658.18 Computed log 
Packets per hour 23,263 196 ×1,000 0.95 47.27 1 6,987.27 Computed log 
Packets per Internet host 35,423 201  6.40 384.30 0 52,041.29 Computed log 
Hours of attack per Internet host 35,423 201  0.012 0.134 0 6 Computed log 
Number of victim IP addresses 
per Internet host 35,423 201  0.011 0.127 0 6 Computed log 
Country Demographics (annual data) 
Unemployment rate 24,960 147 % economically active people 8.57 6.55 0.20 77.00 GMID  
Higher education students 29,310 166 per 100 inhabitant 0.025 0.019 0 8.8 GMID log 
GDP in PPP 32,178 182 Thousand dollars per capita 12.54 14.27 0.25 84.25 GMID log 
Number of Internet users 35,010 198 per 1,000 inhabitant 242.15 245.00 0.24 911.32 GMID log 
Number of Internet hosts 31,638 230 per 1,000 inhabitant 63.66 240.81 0 5,302.74 CIA log 
% digital main lines 35,514 201 % of telephone main lines 94.61 15.10 0.70 100 GMID  
ISDN subscribers 25,222 146 per 1,000 inhabitant 15.90 37.44 0 239.44 GMID log 
Land area 36,099 204 sq. kilometer per 1,000 inhabitant 41.57 83.02 0.05 617.12 GMID log 
External AS connections 27,157  per 1,000 Internet hosts 0.025 0.11 0 1.67 CAIDA  
Quality of Governance (annual data) 
Control of corruption 36,150 206 Normalized index 0.01 1.00 -1.92 2.59 WGI  
Government effectiveness 36,150 206 Normalized index 0.01 1.00 -2.45 2.37 WGI  
Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism 36,717 208 Normalized index 0.01
1.00 -3.30 1.59 WGI  
Regulatory quality 36,150 206 Normalized index 0.00 1.00 -2.66 1.99 WGI  
Rule of law 36,743 208 Normalized index 0.01 1.00 -2.68 2.01 WGI  
Voice and accountability 36,603 207 Normalized index 0.01 1.00 -2.30 1.83 WGI  
Conventional Crime Statistics (annual data) 
Money laundering/financial 
crimes country/jurisdiction 42,480 240 1 = Yes; 0 = No 0.24 0.43 0 1 USDOS  
Judge  11,127 111 Per 100,000 inhabitant 15.45 19.46 0 195.70 UNODC log 
Theft  15,224 96 Per 100,000 inhabitant 864.46 951.40 1.90 4,926.40 UNODC log 
Total untried/pre-trial persons 
held 17,813 98 Per 100,000 inhabitant 69.48 107.13 1.30 725.10 UNODC log 
Prosecuted  10,802 79 Per 100,000 inhabitant 1,312.02 1,784.89 0.40 10,321.10 UNODC log 
Convicted  10,840 83 Per 100,000 inhabitant 798.81 1,117.63 6.10 7,390.70 UNODC log 
Data sources: COE = Council of Europe; CAIDA = Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis; GMID = Global Market Information Database; CIA = Central 
Intelligence Agency; WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators; UNODC = United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; USDOS = U.S. Department of State. 
 
  
TABLE 4 – CORRELATIONS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
1. Signature 1
2. Enforcement 0.49 1
3. Reservation 0.27 0.56 1
4. Number of packets -0.04 0.00 0.13 1
5. Hours of attack 0.13 0.01 0.24 0.22 1
6. Number of victim IP addresses 0.13 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.99 1
7. Packets per victim IP address -0.05-0.02-0.01 0.32 0.00 0.00 1
8. Packets per victim IP address per hour -0.03-0.01-0.01 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.81 1
9. Packets per hour -0.05-0.02-0.01 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.81 1
10. Packets per Internet host -0.05-0.02-0.01 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.09 0.24 1 
11. Hours of attack per Internet host -0.12-0.05-0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 1 
12. Number of victim IP addresses per Internet host -0.12-0.05-0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.98 1
13. Unemployment rate 0.19 0.12-0.10 -0.07-0.07-0.06-0.03-0.02-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 1
14. Higher education students 0.29 0.22 0.26 -0.03 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.15 -0.15 -0.18 1 
15. GDP in PPP 0.30 0.02 0.17 -0.03 0.16 0.15-0.01 0.00-0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.40 0.15 1
16. Number of Internet users 0.49 0.17 0.25 -0.02 0.16 0.15-0.02-0.01-0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.32 0.43 0.76 1
17. Number of Internet hosts 0.39 0.23 0.37 0.01 0.25 0.24-0.02-0.01-0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.27 0.35 0.53 0.72 1
18. % digital main lines -0.05-0.10-0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05-0.07-0.06-0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.16 -0.13 0.27 0.28 0.18 1
19. ISDN subscribers 0.53 0.17 0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.03-0.03-0.02-0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 0.10 0.52 0.53 0.38 0.17 1
20. Land area -0.06-0.06-0.01 -0.03-0.01-0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.27 0.04 0.10 0.24-0.02-0.05 1
21. External AS connections  -0.13-0.06-0.04 -0.02-0.03-0.03-0.01-0.01-0.01 0.06 0.67 0.67 -0.03 0.20 0.05-0.10-0.10 0.00-0.08 0.12 1
22. Control of corruption 0.42 0.06 0.17 -0.05 0.14 0.13-0.04-0.03-0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.29 -0.13 0.78 0.86 0.67 0.36 0.52 0.13-0.09 1
23. Government effectiveness 0.45 0.08 0.19 -0.01 0.16 0.15-0.03-0.01-0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.27 0.32 0.74 0.87 0.63 0.37 0.51 0.07-0.12 0.95 1 
24. Political stability & absence of violence/terrorism 0.48 0.17 0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.00-0.04-0.02-0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.29 0.34 0.67 0.71 0.47 0.18 0.45 0.18-0.02 0.74 0.72 1 
25. Regulatory quality 0.51 0.15 0.19 -0.04 0.15 0.15-0.04-0.02-0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.22 0.34 0.71 0.83 0.58 0.33 0.48 0.04-0.11 0.90 0.94 0.73 1 
26. Rule of law 0.47 0.08 0.20 -0.03 0.14 0.14-0.04-0.03-0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.28 0.33 0.76 0.86 0.63 0.38 0.53 0.10-0.09 0.96 0.96 0.77 0.93 1 
27. Voice and accountability 0.63 0.22 0.20 -0.14 0.13 0.12-0.08-0.05-0.07 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17 -0.11 0.35 0.48 0.72 0.56 0.31 0.54 0.11-0.17 0.76 0.78 0.63 0.82 0.79 1 
  
TABLE 5 – ESTIMATIONS USING DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF CRIME RATE 







Number of  
packets
OLS:
Packets per victim 
IP address
COC enforcement -0.135 -0.639*** 0.202* 0.344***
(0.108) (0.065) (0.106) (0.064)
Constant -0.597*** -6.973*** -5.821*** 2.285***
(0.199) (0.140) (0.215) (0.131)
Country-specific effects Random Fixed Fixed Fixed
Time trends Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Observations 42,480 35,423 35,423 23,263
Within R-square 0.214 0.082 0.252
Number of countries 240 229 229 196
Notes: Random-effects probit model in column (1); fixed-effects OLS specification in columns (2)-(4).  Column (1): 
Whether a country was attacked as dependent variable; Column (2): Log number of victim IP addresses per Internet host as 
dependent variable; Column (3): Log number of packets per Internet host as dependent variable; Column (4): Log number 
of packets per victim IP address as dependent variable.  Because Internet host data were missing for some countries, and 
some countries were not attacked at all (so did not have any victim IP address) in the sample, we had to exclude these 
countries in the OLS regressions in columns (2)-(4).  Spatial correlation consistent standard errors in parentheses except for 






TABLE 6 – MAIN ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




COC enforcement and 













VARIABLES Selection  Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Outcome Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
             
COC enforcement -0.135 0.715***   -0.192 0.511*** 0.519*** 0.493*** -0.373* 0.427*** -0.240 0.705*** 
 (0.108) (0.100)   (0.134) (0.065) (0.058) (0.062) (0.203) (0.067) (0.157) (0.083) 
COC reservation           0.058 -0.137*** 
           (0.099) (0.033) 
GDP in PPP   0.228 1.268*** 0.241 1.226*** 0.438 0.905** 0.557* -0.246 0.236 1.153*** 
   (0.215) (0.406) (0.216) (0.400) (0.327) (0.367) (0.333) (0.377) (0.216) (0.404) 
Unemployment rate   0.046** -0.016 0.046** -0.011 -0.006 -0.004 0.109*** -0.001 0.046** -0.007 
   (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Higher education students    0.488*** 3.599*** 0.509*** 3.515*** 2.784*** 3.405*** 1.269*** 3.501*** 0.513*** 3.470*** 
   (0.183) (0.289) (0.184) (0.295) (0.237) (0.285) (0.286) (0.294) (0.185) (0.295) 
Number of Internet users   -0.295*** 0.240*** -0.314*** 0.281*** 0.197*** 0.233*** -0.257* 0.126 -0.315*** 0.294*** 
   (0.099) (0.087) (0.100) (0.089) (0.074) (0.086) (0.135) (0.088) (0.101) (0.088) 
% digital main lines   -0.004 0.013** -0.004 0.009 0.005 0.011** 0.011 0.015*** -0.004 0.008 
   (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
ISDN subscribers   -0.018 0.769*** -0.011 0.838*** 0.715*** 0.835*** -0.150 0.889*** -0.007 0.809*** 
   (0.075) (0.098) (0.076) (0.097) (0.082) (0.094) (0.106) (0.096) (0.076) (0.099) 
Land area   0.053 -3.791*** 0.056 -4.151*** -2.773*** -4.052*** 0.003 -3.488*** 0.054 -4.114*** 
   (0.098) (0.812) (0.099) (0.814) (0.731) (0.787) (0.160) (0.811) (0.099) (0.814) 
Control of corruption   -0.660*** -0.083 -0.697*** -0.114 -0.148 -0.106 -1.072*** -0.180 -0.693*** -0.183 
   (0.211) (0.182) (0.213) (0.182) (0.160) (0.180) (0.293) (0.182) (0.213) (0.183) 
Government effectiveness   0.301 -0.320* 0.248 -0.149 0.082 -0.069 0.253 0.017 0.244 -0.144 
   (0.213) (0.168) (0.217) (0.166) (0.152) (0.162) (0.278) (0.167) (0.217) (0.168) 
Political stability & absence   -0.604*** 0.547*** -0.609*** 0.518*** 0.579*** 0.551*** -1.070*** 0.525*** -0.612*** 0.582*** 
    of violence/terrorism   (0.128) (0.132) (0.128) (0.131) (0.108) (0.125) (0.175) (0.130) (0.128) (0.132) 
Regulatory quality   -0.433* -0.447*** -0.409* -0.408** -0.614*** -0.364** -0.486 -0.490*** -0.404* -0.448*** 
   (0.222) (0.156) (0.224) (0.156) (0.135) (0.151) (0.306) (0.157) (0.224) (0.155) 
Rule of law   1.390*** 1.234*** 1.449*** 1.113*** 0.930*** 0.975*** 2.191*** 1.200*** 1.442*** 1.175*** 
   (0.283) (0.248) (0.288) (0.250) (0.203) (0.244) (0.392) (0.253) (0.288) (0.251) 
Voice accountability   0.278 -0.132 0.280 -0.151 -0.481*** -0.089 0.721*** 0.031 0.275 -0.183 
   (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.150) (0.168) (0.274) (0.170) (0.173) (0.171) 
Number of Internet hosts   -0.129**  -0.128**    0.047  -0.129**  
   (0.062)  (0.062)    (0.096)  (0.062)  
Number of Internet    -0.011***  -0.011***    -0.003  -0.011***  
    hosts squared   (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.004)  
Selection bias   -4.272***  -0.061*  -0.065* -0.015 -0.069**  -0.011  -0.064* 
    correction term  (0.803)  (0.034)  (0.035) (0.030) (0.033)  (0.011)  (0.035) 
Constant -0.597*** 3.327*** 0.685 51.603*** 0.706 55.485*** 40.828*** 54.451*** 3.905 53.200*** 0.738 55.114*** 
 (0.199) (0.259) (1.748) (8.203) (1.756) (8.266) (7.357) (7.986) (2.686) (8.238) (1.757) (8.277) 
             
Country specific effects Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed 
Time trends Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.  Inc. Inc. -- -- Inc. Inc. 
Day fixed effects -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Inc. Inc. -- -- 
             
Within R-square  0.256  0.284  0.286 0.234 0.244  0.308  0.286 
Observations 42,480 23,263 16,429 13,827 16,429 13,827 13,827 13,827 16,429 13,827 16,429 13,827 
Number of countries 240 196 106 104 106 104 104 104 106 104 106 104 
Notes: Selection model uses random-effects probit specification with an indicator denoting whether a country was attacked as dependent variable; outcome model uses fixed-effects OLS specification with log 
number of packets per victim IP address as dependent variable, except otherwise stated.   Column (1): Only COC enforcement as regressor; Column (2): Only demographic and control variables as regressors; 
Column (3): All variables, including COC enforcement, as regressors – the preferred specification; Column (4): Use log packet per victim IP address per hour as dependent variable in the outcome model; 
Column (5): Use log packet per hour as dependent variable in the outcome model; Column (6): Day fixed effects instead of time trends; Column (7): Include COC reservation interacted with COC enforcement 
as independent variable.  Spatial correlation consistent standard errors in parentheses in all outcome models; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
TABLE 7 – IDENTIFICATION TESTS 
 (1) (2) 
 Add number of 
professional judges or 
magistrates 
Add external AS 
connections 
VARIABLES Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
     
COC enforcement 1.077 2.419*** -0.264 -0.041 
 (0.674) (0.495) (0.282) (0.148) 
Judge 0.015 0.076   
 (0.149) (0.174)   
COC enforcement × Judge  -0.342 -0.778***   
 (0.256) (0.171)   
External AS connections   0.139*** 0.129*** 
   (0.048) (0.039) 
COC enforcement ×   0.020 0.110*** 
    External AS connections   (0.066) (0.028) 
Selection bias   -0.030***  0.007 
    correction term  (0.009)  (0.035) 
Constant 0.981 69.260*** 0.672 55.908*** 
 (2.332) (22.133) (1.559) (8.836) 
     
Country specific effects Random Fixed Random Fixed
Time trends Inc. Inc. Inc.  Inc.
     
Within R-square  0.280  0.292 
Observations 9,005 7,674 15,379 13,380 
Number of countries 66 65 100 100 
Notes: Selection model uses random-effects probit specification with an indicator denoting whether a 
country was attacked as dependent variable; outcome model uses fixed-effects OLS specification with log 
number of packets per victim IP address as dependent variable.  All specifications include the 
demographic and control variables, and the governance quality indicators reported in Table 6 as 
independent variables.  Column (1): Add number of professional judges or magistrates and its interaction 
with COC enforcement as independent variables; Column (2): Add external AS connections and its 
interaction with COC enforcement as independent variables.  Spatial correlation consistent standard errors 
in parentheses in all outcome models; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 8 – FALSIFICATION TESTS 




Theft Prosecution Conviction Untried/pretrial 
held 
COC signature 
VARIABLES      Selection Outcome 
        
COC enforcement -0.422 -0.019 -0.029 0.002 0.034   
 (1.142) (0.053) (0.050) (0.029) (0.092)   
COC signature      0.155 -0.041 
      (0.257) (0.186) 
Selection bias        -0.060* 
    correction term       (0.034) 
Constant 54.046*** 5.473 66.965* 34.548*** -8.646 0.541 51.645*** 
 (16.767) (4.694) (36.630) (12.495) (6.974) (1.753) (8.196) 
        
Country specific effects Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Random Fixed
Time trends Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
        
Within R-square  0.125 0.145 0.210 0.148  0.284 
Observations 16,429 12,122 9,009 9,046 10,079 16,429 13,827 
Number of countries 106 83 61 66 74 106 104 
Notes: Random-effects probit specification in column (1); fixed-effects OLS specification in column (2); for column (3), the selection model uses random-effects 
probit specification with an indicator denoting whether a country was attacked as dependent variable; the outcome model uses fixed-effects OLS specification with 
log number of packets per victim IP address as dependent variable.  All specifications include the demographic and control variables, and the governance quality 
indicators reported in Table 6, as independent variables.  Column (1): An indicator denoting whether a country was listed as a money laundering/financial crime 
country/jurisdiction by USDOS as dependent variable; Column (2): Log per-capita crime statistics as dependent variables; Column (3): Use COC signature in place 
of COC enforcement.  Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses in column (2); spatial correlation consistent standard errors in parentheses in the 
outcome model in column (3); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
TABLE 9 – ROBUSTNESS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
 Only countries  
that  
enforced COC 
Only countries  
in  
Council of Europe 
6-month lag  12-month lag Only countries  
attacked for  
at least 1 day 
Exclude countries  
attacked  
every day 
VARIABLES Selection  Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
             
COC enforcement -0.039 0.466*** -0.052 0.550***     -0.168 0.511*** -0.294* 1.076*** 
 (0.162) (0.067) (0.288) (0.073)     (0.131) (0.064) (0.172) (0.114) 
COC enforcement     -0.118 0.551***       
    lagged by 6 months     (0.129) (0.062)       
COC enforcement       -0.028 0.561***     
    lagged by 12 months       (0.128) (0.064)     
Selection bias   -0.026  0.012*  -0.056  -0.062*  -0.067**  -0.097*** 
    correction term  (0.034)  (0.006)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
Constant -0.381 -253.169*** 4.147 -114.054*** 0.711 57.271*** 0.691 57.043*** 1.296 55.274*** -1.196 75.869*** 
 (4.496) (32.845) (11.102) (24.343) (1.750) (8.289) (1.747) (8.294) (1.543) (8.275) (2.612) (9.412) 
             
Country specific effects Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed 
Time trends Inc. Inc.  Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.  Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
             
Within R-square  0.3212  0.2969  0.2866  0.2868  0.2859  0.3363 
Observations 5,679 5,125 6,945 5,871 16,429 13,827 16,429 13,827 15,952 13,826 9,004 6,576 
Number of countries 34 34 41 40 106 104 106 104 103 103 61 59 
Notes: Selection model uses random-effects probit specification with an indicator denoting whether a country was attacked as dependent variable; outcome model uses fixed-effects OLS specification with 
log number of packets per victim IP address as dependent variable.  All specifications include the demographic and control variables, and the governance quality indicators reported in Table 6, as 
independent variables.  Column (1): Include only countries that had enforced the COC; Column (2): Include only Council of Europe countries; Column (3): COC enforcement lagged by 6 months; Column 
(4): COC enforcement lagged by 12 months; Column (5): Exclude Cape Verde, Dominical Republic, and Saint Lucia which were not attacked in any day in the sample; Column (6): Exclude Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States which were attacked in every day in the sample.  Spatial correlation consistent standard errors in parentheses in all outcome models; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
TABLE 10 – COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS 
Country 
Net effect of COC 
enforcement Wald Statistic  
Iceland (control) -1.185 F(1, 103) = 30.42 Prob > F = 0.000 
Albania 0.902 F(1, 103) = 12.37 Prob > F = 0.001 
Armenia 1.666 F(1, 103) = 30.60 Prob > F = 0.000 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -1.027 F(1, 103) = 5.90 Prob > F = 0.000 
Bulgaria 0.011 F(1, 103) = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.972 
Cyprus 2.095 F(1, 103) = 133.51 Prob > F = 0.000 
Denmark -0.089 F(1, 103) = 0.17 Prob > F = 0.679 
Estonia 0.732 F(1, 103) = 4.30 Prob > F = 0.041 
Finland 0.687 F(1, 103) = 8.55 Prob > F = 0.004 
France 0.456 F(1, 103) = 3.84 Prob > F = 0.053 
Croatia 1.080 F(1, 103) = 4.16 Prob > F = 0.044 
Hungary 0.351 F(1, 103) = 1.02 Prob > F = 0.314 
Italy -1.251 F(1, 103) = 2.65 Prob > F = 0.107 
Lithuania 0.238 F(1, 103) = 0.13 Prob > F = 0.717 
Latvia 0.704 F(1, 103) = 9.11 Prob > F = 0.003 
Republic of Macedonia 0.474 F(1, 103) = 3.61 Prob > F = 0.060 
Netherlands 1.336 F(1, 103) = 35.66 Prob > F = 0.000 
Norway -0.174 F(1, 103) = 0.77 Prob > F = 0.383 
Romania 1.044 F(1, 103) = 12.60 Prob > F = 0.001 
Slovenia -0.735 F(1, 103) = 3.20 Prob > F = 0.077 
Slovakia -1.283 F(1, 103) = 2.50 Prob > F = 0.117 
Ukraine 2.266 F(1, 103) = 80.54 Prob > F = 0.000 
The United States 0.205 F(1, 103) = 0.91 Prob > F = 0.342 
Note: We first estimated the fixed-effects OLS outcome model with the selection bias correction term by 
including interactions of each country with the COC enforcement variable, treating Iceland as the control.  
The coefficient of Iceland (–1.185) was then added to each interaction variable involving another country 
to compute the net effect of COC enforcement for that other country. 
  
TABLE 11 – COC ENFORCEMENT: NATIONAL IMPACTS 




Packets Hours of 
attack 
    
COC enforcement -0.258*** 0.714*** -0.224*** 
 (0.043) (0.090) (0.044) 
COC reservation 0.249*** -0.213*** 0.246*** 
 (0.037) (0.065) (0.037) 
Constant 42.276*** 21.862** 40.133*** 
 (3.534) (10.177) (3.649) 
    
Country specific effects Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Time trends Inc. Inc. Inc. 
    
Within R-square 0.3905 0.2363 0.3516 
Observations 16,429 16,429 16,429 
Number of countries 106 106 106 
Notes: Fixed-effects OLS specification in all columns.  All specifications include the 
demographic and control variables, and the governance quality indicators reported in Table 6, 
as independent variables.  Column (1): Log number of victim IP address per Internet host as 
dependent variable; Column (2): Log number of packets per Internet host as dependent variable; 
Column (3): Log hours of attack per Internet host as dependent variable.  Spatial correlation 
consistent standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
